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Abstract Antonymic pairs of gradable adjectives (e.g. tall-short) give
rise to contrary opposition. This fact has so far stood in the way of
reducing this type of opposition to logical negation, which gives rise
to contradictory opposition. We present an analysis of these antonymic
pairs in terms of an underlying logical negation, and propose to derive
the contrary nature of the opposition from the interaction of interval
semantics with the presence of a contextual standard, which is known
to be a part of the denotation of gradable adjectives. This analysis
opens the way for a decomposition of negative adjectives as containing
a logical negation with contradictory meaning.
1 Introduction
Consider the following examples:
(1) a. Linus is tall.
b. Linus is short.
Suppose (1a) is true; then (1b) cannot be true as well. But both sentences
can be false together, namely in a situation where Linus is neither tall nor
short, but of average height. This is, in other words, a case of contrary
opposition: it holds between two sentences that cannot be true together,
but that can be false together. Scalar adjectives like tall and short refer to
a scale of tallness, and (informally) denote areas on that scale. Assume,
for argument’s sake, that anyone shorter than 175cm counts as short, and
anyone above 185cm counts as tall. The area denoted by short is then
indicated by the blue line on the top line of Figure 1; similarly, the area
of tall is the red line a the top. The contrary nature of the opposition
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between tall and short now translates into the existence of a neutral area
in the middle of scale, namely the area between 175 and 185cm, which
counts as neither tall nor short (the dotted line in Figure 1). This neutral
area is context-dependent, an issue which we shall return to in section 3
below.1





(2) a. Linus is tall.
b. Linus is not tall.
These sentences instantiate contradictory opposition: (2a) and (2b) can-
not both be true together, nor can they can be false together. For ex-
ample, if a person’s height were 180cm, we would be justified to say
that the person is not tall. This is because an individual is either tall or
not tall, and cannot be anything in between. In terms of our diagram in
Figure 1, there is no neutral area between the two red lines, which rep-
resent the domain of tall and not tall; nor is there one between the two
blue lines of short and not short.
What we can conclude from that is that the sentential negator not
gives rise to contradictory opposition, but that antonymic pairs like tall-
1 For clarity of exposition, we limit ourselves in this paper to a particular type of ant-
onyms, namely those which Kennedy (2001a) calls dimensional adjectives, such as
long–short, wide–narrow, high–low, etc. What characterises the scales that these ad-
jectives refer to is the fact that ‘the parameter expressed by [the] adjective has a van-
ishing zero-value, and no upper limit’ (Seuren 1978:340). With a vanishing endpoint,
he means that at value 0 the parameter ceases to exist. For example, we would not
say that an object with zero tallness is short, but rather that it lacks the tallness dimen-
sion altogether. In contrast, a person with zero possessions still qualifies as poor. We
shall not discuss antonyms like rich–poor, nice–ugly etc., which behave differently
in certain respects (e.g. with respect to the equivalence to be discussed in section 6
below).
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short are related by contrary opposition (see also Horn 1989).2 Now in
earlier work (De Clercq and Vanden Wyngaerd 2017) we have argued
that negative adjectives like short contain a Neg feature, which is also
found in the sentence negator not. This Neg feature explains a well-
known asymmetry between positive and negative adjectives, which is
that negative adjectives systematically resist un-prefixation (e.g. un-
happy vs *unsad; see Zimmer 1964; Horn 1989). The assumption that
negative adjectives contain a covert negation presupposes a form of de-
composition. Concretely, we assume that the syntax works with fea-
tures, and the lexicon is postsyntactic. The concrete means by which an
adjective like short spells out a set of features, including a Neg feature,
is by assuming the nanosyntactic mechanism of phrasal spellout: every
syntactic object created by Merge interfaces with the lexicon, and un-
dergoes spellout if a matching lexical item is found. The organisation
of the lexicon is subject to the following restriction (Starke 2014):
(3) The lexicon contains nothing but well-formed syntactic expres-
sions.
The consequence of this is that lexical items contain well-formed syn-
tactic trees. We return to the precise decomposition of short and similar
adjectives below.
This analysis, however, raises the following puzzle: why does neg-
ation sometimes give rise to contrary opposition, as in the case of ant-
onymic adjectives, and sometimes to contradictory opposition, as in the
case of the sentence negator not? The question is particularly pregnant
for our decomposition analysis, which assumes the same Neg feature
to be present in both. It is this question that we aim to answer in this
paper. We shall argue that an analysis of negative gradable adjectives
is possible in terms of the presence of a contradictory negation in their
2 We abstract away here from the fact that a sentence like (2b) may have a reading where
not tall gets a stronger meaning, equivalent with short. Horn (1989) calls this the
pragmatic strengthening of a contradictory negation to a contrary one. Such pragmatic
strengthening is not found with the negative pole of the scale (not short), nor with
nonscalar predications (e.g. John laughed-John didn’t laugh). Also see Krifka (2007);
Ruytenbeek et al. (2017).
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internal structure, which at the same time allows for the existence of a
contrary relationship with their positive antonyms.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the
notion of an interval or extent, and show how positive and negative ex-
tents are related by a relation of contradictoriness. Section 3 discusses
the context-dependence of gradable adjectives. In section 4 we show
how the contrary opposition can arise from the presence of an underly-
ing contradictory negation. Section 5 discusses the syntax of antonymic
gradable adjectives. Finally, in section 6 we show how our analysis
straightforwardly derives an equivalence that exists between antonymic
adjectives in the comparative.
2 Extents
The analysis that we propose of gradable adjectives draws heavily on
Seuren (1978), whose analysis is based on interval semantics, in which
gradable adjectives are taken to denote intervals or extents (see also
Seuren 1984; von Stechow 1984; Löbner 1990; Kennedy 2001a; von
Stechow 2008; Roelandt 2016).
An extent is a part of a scale. A scale SDIM is a set of linearly ordered
set of points along a dimension DIM. An extent E is a nonempty subset
of S with the following property (Landman 1991:110):
(4) ∀p1, p2 ∈ E,∀p3 ∈ S, [(p1 < p3 < p2)→ (p3 ∈ E)]
Assume further a degree function dDIM, which maps any entity x which
can be ordered along some dimension DIM onto a unique point on the
scale SDIM. This unique point divides the scale into two intervals or
extents, a positive and negative one, as defined in (5):
(5) a. POSDIM(x) = {p ∈ SDIM | p≤ d(x)}
b. NEGDIM(x) = {p ∈ SDIM | ¬[p≤ d(x)]}
Suppose, for example, that d(Kurt) = 167; then the corresponding pos-
itive and negative extents can be represented as in (6) (the orientation of
the square bracket indicates whether or not the point next to it is included
in the extent).
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(6) a. POSHEIGHT (Kurt) = [0,167]
b. NEGHEIGHT (Kurt) =]167,∞[
A graphical representation is given in Figure 2, with the red line the
positive extent of x, and the blue line x’s negative extent.
Figure 2: Positive and negative extent
0 ∞167
In our definition of a negative extent given in (5b), we differ from
Kennedy (2001a:211), who defines the negative extent not in terms of
negation but by reversing the ordering relation:
(7) a. POSDIM(x) = {p ∈ SDIM | p≤ d(x)}
b. NEGDIM(x) = {p ∈ SDIM | p≥ d(x)}
As a result, a positive extent and its negative companion are join com-
plementary, i.e. they share a single point, namely d(x). In our definition,
these extents are fully complementary as a result of the presence of neg-
ation in the definition of the negative extent in (6b). This will allow us
to consider the relationship between a positive and a negative extent as
a case of contradictoriness, as we shall show now.
Intuitively, positive and negative extents entertain a relation of con-
tradictoriness: together, they exhaust the universe (i.e. the entire scale),
and there is no neutral area in between them. We formalise this idea by







3 That the logical relations between propositions are analogous to relations between sets
was noted by Keynes (1906:119;174) (L. Demey, p.c.).
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Contradictory opposition involves a relation between two items where
their set-theoretic union amounts to the UniverseU . In the case of con-
trariety, set-theoretic union yields less than the universe. In either case,
the intersection of both sets is empty. Let us first show that this set-
theoretic definition can be applied to propositions. This is done by tak-
ing the denotation of a proposition to be the set of situations in which
it is true (Van Fraassen 1971). Two propositions are then contradictory
if their union equals the Universe of all possible situations, and con-
trary if their union does not denote the Universe. In either case, their
intersection will yield the empty set: the set of situations where both
propositions are true is empty, i.e. they cannot be true together.
But the definitions in (8) also work to directly establish a relation
of contradictoriness between extents, since extents are sets. By (8a),
the relation between the positive and negative extent in (6) (and in the
corresponding Figure 2) is a contradictory one: their union is the entire
scale, and their intersection is empty. In the case of contrary opposition,
the union of the two sets does is less than the Universe: this can be seen
in the top line of Figure 1, where the blue line of short and the red one of
tall together do not amount to the entire scale. Here too, the intersection
of the two sets is empty.
The contradictory nature of the opposition between positive and neg-
ative extents follows directly from the presence of logical negation (¬)
in the definition of a negative extent in (5b) above. We may therefore
define a negative extentmore concisely as follows (see also von Stechow
1984):
(9) NEGDIM(x) = ¬POSDIM(x)
This will be important when we look at the relationship between ant-
onymic adjectives.
A crucial assumption is that positive gradable adjective denote a pos-
itive extent, and negative gradable adjectives a negative extent, as shown
in (10) for the pair tall-short (see also Kennedy 2001a;b; Heim 2006;
Büring 2007; Heim 2008):
(10) a. Jtall(x)K = POSHEIGHT (x)
b. Jshort(x)K = NEGHEIGHT (x)
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That is, Jtall(x)K is the set of degrees towhich x is tall, whereas Jshort(x)K
is the set of degrees to which x is not tall. The antonymic pair in (10)
therefore stands in a relationship of contradictoriness, mediated by lo-
gical negation.
Given the equation in (9) above, we can now assume that negative
scalar adjectives contain a logical negation in their internal structure, as
proposed in De Clercq and Vanden Wyngaerd (2017).
(11) Jshort(x)K = J¬tall(x)K = ¬POSHEIGHT (x) = NEGHEIGHT (x)
The arboreal representation of this is given in (12). We assume that
gradable adjectives involve a Q feature, which semantically contributes
an ordering (De Clercq and VandenWyngaerd 2017). Negative gradable





= Jtall(x)K = [0,r]HEIGHT
Now this analysis obviously raises the question where the contrariness
comes from in this (and similar) pairs of antonyms. In order to an-
swer that question, we first need to consider the issue of the context-
dependence of scalar adjectives.
3 Context-dependence
It has long been known that the interpretation of gradable adjectives is
sensitive to a contextual standard (Wheeler 1972; Seuren 1978; Klein
1980, and much subsequent work). For example, a sentence like Kurt
is tall does not mean that Kurt has a degree on the scale of height, but
rather that Kurt’s degree on the scale of height exceeds a contextually
given standard. This standard may be made explicit, as in the following
examples:
(13) a. Kurt is tall for a Bolivian.
b. Kurt is not tall for a Swede.
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Varying the standard may lead to the sentence changing its truth value;
as a result, both sentences of (13) may be true together. If we take out
the standard again, but interpret the implicit standard as in (13), this
may lead to an apparent violation of the Law of Contradiction (LC):
¬(p∧¬p).
(14) a. Kurt is tall.
b. Kurt is not tall.
These two sentences can be true together if we interpret (14a) as (13a)
and (14b) as (13b). The LC can be upheld, however, by stipulating that
in sentences with gradable adjectives, the (implicit) standard of compar-
ison of a sentence and its negation needs to be held constant.
Following Seuren (1978), we take this contextual standard or aver-
age itself to be an extent, i.e. the context-sensitive intervalAC of average
height, or the set of degrees that counts as neither neither tall nor short
(see also von Stechow 2008). For the above example, let the relevant
extents be as in (15):4
(15) a. AC = [175,185] (Swedish men)
b. AB = [145,155] (Bolivian men)
With this much in place, we are ready to explain how the contradict-
ory negation in the internal makeup of negative adjectives gives rise to
contrary opposition.
4 Deriving contrariety from extent inclusion
Contrariety in pairs of antonymic adjectives is a direct consequence of
the truth conditions on sentences with gradable adjectives, to which we
turn now. Following Seuren (1978), we formulate these truth conditions
in terms of extent inclusion. We define inclusion as in (16):
(16) For two extents X and Y ,
X ⊆ Y ⇐⇒ ((X ∩Y = X)∧ (X ∪Y = Y )).
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_average_human_height_worldwide
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A sentence like Linus is tall is true if the positive extent of Linus’s height
includes the contextual average AC. Similarly for negative adjectives,
except that they involve a negative extent: Kurt is short is true in case
the negative extent of Kurt’s height includes AC.
(17) a. JLinus is tallK = 1 ⇐⇒ POSHEIGHT (Linus)⊇ AC
b. JKurt is shortK = 1 ⇐⇒ NEGHEIGHT (Kurt)⊇ AC
Figure 3 illustrates these inclusion relationships (where d(Linus) = 193
and d(Kurt) = 167). The bold red line is the positive extent of Linus’
height, and it includes the interval of the average height of Swedish men
AC. The bold blue line is the negative extent of Kurt’s height, and it
likewise includes the interval of the average height of Swedish men AC.




In this model, then, both sentences of (17) will come out as true.
Now suppose Eva is of average height, e.g. d(Eva) = 182. Since
this value is included in the contextual average AC, neither the positive
nor the negative extent of Eva’s height will include AC. This is shown in
Figure 4. As a result, both the sentence Eva is tall and Eva is short will
come out as false. This derives the contrary opposition of the latter two
sentences, since they are both false at the same time (though not both
true at the same time, as the reader may verify).




Now recall from above the contradictory pair in (2), repeated here:
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(2) a. Linus is tall.
b. Linus is not tall.
The truth condition of (2a) is as before (see (18a)). In line with our
earlier analysis in terms of extent inclusion, (2b) is true if the (positive)
extent of Linus’ height does not include the contextual average.
(18) a. JLinus is tallK = 1 ⇐⇒ POSHEIGHT (Linus)⊇ AC
b. JLinus is not tallK = 1 ⇐⇒ POSHEIGHT (Linus) ̸⊇ AC
In our example of Swedish men (i.e. given that AC = [175,185]; see
(15a) above), (18a) will come out as true for all values of d(x) equal to or
higher than 185, since this will give rise to positive extents that include
AC, whose upper bound is 185. By the same reasoning, (18b) will be
true for any d(x) that is lower than 185, since such extents do not include
AC. It is easy to see that these two cases are exactly complementary: any
value of x that makes (2a) true makes (2b) false, and vice versa. The net
result is contradictory opposition. We leave it to the reader to verify that
the same works for the contradictory pair short-not short.
In sum, the analysis we propose takes antonymic pairs of adjectives
to be related by a Neg feature, which gives rise to contradictory opposi-
tion between a positive extent and its negative complement. Contrariety
follows from the truth conditions of gradable adjectives, which are for-
mulated in terms of an inclusion relation between two extents: one the
one hand, a context-dependent average AC; on the other, a positive ex-
tent for positive adjectives, and a negative extent for negative adjective
ones.
5 Syntax
The syntax of gradable adjectives that we proposed above still leaves
some issues to be addressed. Recall (from (12) above) that we have
assumed a Neg feature in the makeup of negative gradable adjectives,
which contributes contradictory opposition:






There are three issues with this structure that need to be addressed. The
first is that it does not give us contrariety; the second that it lacks the
aspect of context-dependence of gradable adjectives. Lastly, what (19)
does not give us is a compositional way of getting from (19) to the truth
condition for a sentence like Linus is tall, which involves an inclusion
relationship between a positive or negative extent and the contextual
average. It is from this inclusion relationship that contrariety is the con-
sequence.
Before we go on to modify the syntactic structure in (19) to address
these issues, we first discuss a number of cases where the contextual
average is absent from the interpretation of the adjective.
(20) a. How tall is Kurt?
b. Kurt is (more/less than) 1.5m tall.
c. Kurt is that tall.
(21) a. Kurt is (half/twice) as tall as Lisa.
b. Kurt is (not) as tall as Lisa.
c. Kurt is taller than Lisa.
(22) a. Kurt is too tall for this suit.
b. Kurt is tall enough to be a pilot.
What all these examples have in common is that the adjective tall itself
does not make reference to a contextual standard. This is quite clearly
seen in (20a), which is a question for a degree (any degree) on the scale
of height. The other examples are all interpreted in terms of some stand-
ard or other, but one that is explicitly present in the sentences (e.g. 1.5m,
that (pointing), Lisa’s tallness, for this suit, to be a pilot, suggesting that
the in these cases adjective tall itself does not refer to such a standard.
Following Seuren (1978), we call this the neutral use of tall (or neutral
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tall for short). The use of tall that involves reference to a contextual
standard (e.g. (2a) above) we shall call relative tall.
It is obvious that relative tall has a richer intension than neutral tall,
since it contains both the degree function of neutral tall, as well as a
reference to a standard. The question is how the relation between both
types of tall can be modelled. We suggest that it is a case of syncretism,
i.e. one piece of phonology that is shared by different grammatical cat-
egories. In particular, we shall be assuming two things: (i) given that
relative tall has a richer intensions than neutral tall, it is syntactically
bigger than neutral tall, and (ii) the structure of relative tall contains






In comparison with our earlier tree, this tree adds the feature AC for the
contextual average at the top. The syncretism now arises in virtue of the
fact that tall can spell out both QP (neutral tall) and ACP (relative tall).
The principle by which this happens is the Superset Principle (Starke
2009):
(24) Superset Principle
A lexical entry may spell out a syntactic node iff the lexical tree
is identical to the syntactic tree, or if it contains the syntactic
tree as a constituent.
Concretely, the lexicon entry for tall would contain the entire tree in
(23); this lexical entry could spell out the syntactic object QP, since QP
is contained in the lexical tree, as well as ACP, since in that case the
syntactic tree is identical to the lexical tree.
Semantically, we saw earlier that QP denotes an extent. We now
formulate this a bit more accurately (though not essentially differently)
and say that QP denotes a function from an individual to an extent: to
get an extent we necessarily need a degree, and to get a degree, we need
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an individual who is the input to the degree function d(x) that maps the
individual onto a degree. Using λ -notation, the functions for positive
and negative gradable adjectives are given in (25):
(25) a. λx.POSDIM(x)
b. λx.NEGDIM(x)
The head AC then adds the contextual average, as well as the inclusion
relation, as follows:
(26) a. λx.POSDIM(x)⊃ AC
b. λx.NEGDIM(x)⊃ AC
Now the semantic relationship between neutral tall and relative tall can






Negative adjectives differ from positive ones in the presence of a Neg
feature, which transforms the positive extent into a negative one. The









This completes the account of the syntax of positive and negative grad-
able adjectives, and how the syntax is semantically interpreted.
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6 Comparatives and contraposition
Our analysis also allows a straightforward account of the following equi-
valence that holds between the pairs of antonymic adjectives discussed
in this paper:
(29) Edie is taller than Paul ⇐⇒ Paul is shorter than Edie
Such equivalences arise with all and only adjectives that form antonymic
pairs (as the reader may verify by replacing shorter on the right hand
side of the equation with slimmer, in which case the equivalence breaks
down). This suggests that pairs of antonyms are semantically related;
the obvious way in which they are related is through negation. Inform-
ally put, equivalences like (29) hold because short is somehow equi-
valent to (or has to be decomposed as) not tall. A traditional obstacle
for such an analysis, however, has always been that short is not, in
fact, equivalent to not tall, since tall and short are contrary opposites,
whereas short and not tall are contradictory ones (as explained above).
This nonequivalence, however, only holds for relative tall and short.
As we saw in section 2 above, neutral tall and short are related by (con-
tradictory) negation. As a first point in deriving the equivalence in (29)
therefore, we observe that the comparative involves neutral tall and not
relative tall. This appears from the fact that one cannot infer from (30a)
to (30b), for example if both Edie and Paul are short, in which case (30a)
may be true but (30b) is certainly false:
(30) a. Edie is taller than Paul.
b. Edie is tall.
Next we formulate the equivalence in (29) in a more general format.
Assume a relation of antonymy in terms of the operation of negation, as
follows:
(31) Antonymy
ANT (A,B) ⇐⇒ B= ¬A
This relation holds between the neutral versions of adjectives of ant-
onymic pairs, like neutral tall and neutral short. We can now formulate
the equivalence in (29) more generally as in (32):
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(32) b is more A than a ⇐⇒ a is more ¬A than b
In line with our analysis in terms of extents developed above, we assume
that the meaning of the comparative involves extent inclusion. For ex-
ample, the truth of (33a) requires that the positive extent of Edie’s height
includes the positive extent of Paul’s height, as shown in (33b) (Kennedy
2001a).5
(33) a. Edie is taller than Paul.
b. POSHEIGHT (p)⊂ POSHEIGHT (e)
Similarly, since (34a) involves the negative adjective short, its truth re-
quires that the negative extent of Paul’s height includes the negative
extent of Edie’s height:
(34) a. Paul is shorter than Edie.
b. NEGHEIGHT (e)⊂ NEGHEIGHT (p)
Therefore, what we need to show in order to prove the validity of (32)
is that the following equivalence holds:
(35) POSDIM(a)⊂ POSDIM(b) ⇐⇒ NEGDIM(b)⊂ NEGDIM(a)
This equivalence is in fact the set-theoretic counterpart of the Law of
Contraposition:
(36) Law of Contraposition
p→ q ⇐⇒ ¬q→¬p
The derivation of (35) is straightforward. Abbreviating the positive and
negative extents of a to A and ¬A, respectively (and similarly B and ¬B
for b), (35) amounts to the following:
(37) A⊂ B ⇐⇒ ¬B⊂ ¬A
5 Kennedy’s analysis of the comparative is slightly different, in that it involves exist-
ential quantification over extents, but this is immaterial to the matter discussed here.
Kennedy derives the same result as we do, but since in his analysis positive and neg-
ative extents are join complementary, his derivation is less straightforward.
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Starting from the first subset relation, we have the following sequence
of steps:
(38) (A⊂ B)
⇐⇒ (x ∈ A→ x ∈ B)
⇐⇒ (x ̸∈ B→ x ̸∈ A) (Law of Contraposition)
⇐⇒ (¬B⊂ ¬A)
This proves the general validity of (32). The proof rests on the assump-
tion that a logical relation of negation is defined between pairs of ant-
onymic adjectives.
A similar equivalence holds between the sentence pair in (39a), the
general format of which is given in (39b):
(39) a. Edie is too tall ⇐⇒ Edie is not short enough
b. a is too A ⇐⇒ a is not ¬A enough
For reasons of space, we shall not undertake a demonstration of the latter
equivalence. We refer the reader to Meier (2003); Hacquard (2005) for
discussion.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how the relative readings of antonymic pairs of gradable
adjectives (e.g. tall-short) entertain a relation of contrary opposition.
We have decomposed such adjectives in two respects: first, they contain
a contextual average, and a neutral version of the adjective, which de-
notes an extent. Second, (neutral) negative adjectives are related to their
positive counterparts by means of logical (i.e. contradictory) negation.
This double decomposition allows an account of the logical relations that
exist between pairs of antonymic adjectives, both the contrary relation
between relative readings of antonyms, and the contradictory one that is
at the heart of contrapositional relationship between their comparatives.
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